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RECENT CASE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INDICTMENT--EvIDENCE INADMISSIBLE AT
TRIAL Is ADMISSIBLE IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
Defendant sold marijuana to an undercover officer. Several days later the
police obtained marijuana from the defendant's residence, under color of a defective warrant. Defendant was arrested and later indicted by the grand jury
on separate counts of sale and possession of marijuana. When it was subsequently determined that the evidence of possession was inadmissible as illegally
obtained, the possession count was either formally dropped or not pursued. Defendant was convicted on the sale of marijuana charge. On appeal defendant
contended, inter alia, that the entire indictment should be dismissed on the
grounds that the illegally seized evidence influenced the finding of a true bill
on both counts, and that the grand jury should not have been allowed to consider
the inadmissible evidence. Held, the fourth amendment exclusionary rule has no
application to grand jury proceedings; thus the grand jury's consideration of
evidence inadmissible at a trial does not render the indictment and subsequent
proceedings invalid. West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
mem., 87 Sup. Ct. 131 (1966).
The exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained by an illegal search
and seizure, as mandated by the fourth amendment,' is now considered one of
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions." 2 The doctrine has had a long and controversial past; 3 as originally formulated, the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence
was based on its supposedly unreliable nature, 4 but it is now directed toward
preventing police practices from unjustly impinging on an individual's constitutional rights. 5 The legality of the search depends on whether there was probable
1. The fourth amendment in part guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
2. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (per Cardozo, 3.).
3. For the history and the development of the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence,
see Day, Some Historical Aspects and Recent Developments in the Exclusionary Rde oj
Mapp v. Ohio, 1 Crim. L. Bull. No. 7 (1965); Kamisar, Illegal Searches and Seizures and
Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area
of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. Ill. L.F. 78: Morris, The End of an Experiment in
Federalism-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 407 (1961); Wolfe, A Survey of the
Expanded Exclusionary Rule, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 193 (1963); Annots. 93 L. Ed. 1797
(1949), 96 L. Ed. 145 (1953), 98 L. Ed. 581 (1954), 100 L. Ed. 239 (1957), 6 L. Ed. 2d
1544 (1962), 84 A.L.R. 2d 933 (1962).
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585
(1904); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926)
(The Court, per Cardozo, J., refused to apply the federal rule of Weeks to New York.).
5. The Court has said, "To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial
decision a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibition of the Constitution
intended for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) ; "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the Constitutional guarantee in the only available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217
(1960) (Evidence illegally obtained by state officers is inadmissible in a federal criminal
trial.). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling in part, Wolf v: Colorado,
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cause for the issuance of a search warrant0 or an arrest warrant 7 or for a warrantless search8 incident to a lawful arrest." What constitutes probable cause is a difficult question,' 0 since the test concerns "probabilities... [derived from] the factual
2
and practical considerations of every day life."'" It is clear that the evidence'
338 U.S. 25 (1949) (Mapp extended the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks to state criminal trials.). Some states had already followed Weeks; see, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44
Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). See also Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of
Individual Rights, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (1955) (Tort remedies for illegal arrests are hard
to maintain.); Nagel, Law and Society-Testing the Effect of Excluding Illegally Seized
Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 283 (Statistical evidence shows that Mapp has caused improved police conduct.); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in Fifty States, 1962 Duke LJ. 319.
6. "[Nlo Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 792;
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 180 (1965).
7. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958); Albrecht v. United
States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927).
8. Although the arrest be valid, the incidental search must be reasonable. See United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.") ; Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1961) ("[An arrest is not justified by what the subsequent search
discloses. . . .") ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (A single standard of reasonableness
exists for warrantless searches under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (A search cannot be too remote in time or place and
be upheld as incident to a valid arrest.); People v. Gary, 14 N.Y.2d 730, 199 N.E.2d 171,
250 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 937 (1965); People v. O'Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148,
182 N.E.2d 95, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962). Cf. Cooper v. California, 87 Sup. Ct. 788 (1967).
9. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (A valid arrest depends on whether
there was probable cause for it.); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. 1 177 (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964, ch.
86) ; People v. Valentine, 17 N.Y.2d 128, 216 N.E.2d 321, 269 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1966) ; People
v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 373, 179 N.E.2d 478, 482, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462, 466 (1962). See also
Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev.
46; Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 16 (1957); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 65 (1957); Rothblatt, The Arrest: Probable Cause and Search Without a Search Warrant, 35 Miss. L.J. 252 (1964).
10. The classic test is stated in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959):
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the arresting
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that" an offense has been or is being committed.
Id. at 317, quoting in part, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) ; see also People
v. Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 191 N.E.2d 798, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1963) (equating probable
with reasonable); Moul, Probable Cause: The FederalStandard, 25 Ohio St. L.J. 502 (1964)
(extensive study of federal cases).
11. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
12. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), reaffirmed in, Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) (A search warrant is valid if based on an affidavit relying on
hearsay information obtained from confidential informants.).
Generally this hearsay evidence is based on tips obtained from a confidential informant.
This in turn creates a problem of disclosure or non-disclosure of the informant's identity.
See Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (An informant's identity must be disclosed unless there is sufficient corroborative evidence to establish probable cause.);
People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 204 N.E.2d 188, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965); People v.
Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1962) ; Priestly v. Superior Court
of San Francisco, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958) (per Traynor, J.) ; Drouin v. State,
222 Md. 271, 160 A.2d 85 (1960). See also 8 Wigmore § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961);
Comment, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 840 (1965); Comment, 17 Hastings LJ. 49 (1965); Annot., 76
A.L.R.2d 257 (1961).
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which establishes the requisite probable cause must be specific and particular
4
rather than general.' The whole area of probable cause and the exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence can be considered a morass, to be approached negatively instead of positively: 1 5 the peripheral areas of the exclusionary rule dealing with the extension of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine,' 6 criminal,'

13. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110-11 (1965) (Detailed and specific
affidavits based on observations of government officials, showing underlying circumstances
leading to conclusions, established probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (Where informant's tip establishes probable cause,
the factual basis of information must be shown along with the reliability of the informant.) ;
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (The officer must reveal what the informant said and
why he believed this information credible.) ; cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)
(indicating that in marginal cases search warrants may prevail where warrantless searches
would fall) ; but see, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (There is still a distinction between inadmissibility of evidence based on the Supreme Court's supervisory power over the
lower federal courts, and that evidence held inadmissible in the state courts because commanded by the Constitution.). See also Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and Seizure,
52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 65 (1957).
14. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (Mere recital of conclusions is not
enough.); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1960) ("[G]ood faith on the part of
the arresting officers is not enough. . . ."); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 254 (1938)
(Unsupported testimony of an officer of what an informant told him is not enough.); see
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) (The fourth amendment forbids a general warrant.) ;
Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 13 (1960) (Mere suspicion is not
probable cause.); Note, 51 Calif. L. Rev. 907 (1963) (demonstrates that problems in attempting a balancing approach to finding probable cause, conceptually and in practice, result
in "general" probable cause and "exploratory" searches).
15. It is easier to say what is not probable cause than what is, unless the probative
evidence leading to a finding of probable cause is clear and plentiful, as in United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); see generally Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's
Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 474 (1961).
16. The problem here is how far to extend the causal chain from the initial unlawful
arrest or search to the obtaining of the incriminating evidence. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (Where an entry is unlawful and the arrest invalid, the subsequent incriminating statements are protected by the fourth amendment and inadmissible
in a federal criminal proceeding.). See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. It is evident
that here the distinction between the fourth and fifth amendments is blurred. For a discussion of this, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 35 Fordham L. Rev. 131, 44
Texas L. Rev. 1616 (1966) (taking a sample of defendant's blood did not violate either the
fourth or the fifth amendment).
17. See Burdeau v. McDowelb 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (Evidence illegally obtained by
a private person is admissible in a criminal proceeding.); United States v. Carter, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 495, 35 C.M.R. 367 (1965). See generally Comment, Exclusion of Evidence
Wrongfully Obtained by Private Individuals, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 271; but see Note, 64
Mich. L. Rev. 143 (1965).
For another exception to the exclusionary rule, see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959) (5-4 decision; majority upheld defendant's conviction for refusal to allow a health
inspector without a warrant to examine his home for rodents pursuant to a local ordinance) ;
Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (4-4 affirmance of conviction under a health
inspection ordinance allowing a health inspector to inspect on demand). These cases were
overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 87 Sup. Ct. 1727 (1967). See also Comment, 44
Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1960) (discusses the relationship of health inspection statutes to the fourth
amendment).
For problems dealing with "consent" to search and the admissibility of evidence, see
State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965) (Evidence gained from search to
which wife consented is admissible against the husband in a criminal prosecution for murder.) ; see Note, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 400 (1966) ; Note, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1513 (1966) (both
contain good dicussions of problems dealing with consent).
For possible problems dealing with "exploratory" searches, see N.Y. Code Crim. Proc.
§ 180-a (as amended by N.Y. Sess. Law 1964, ch. 86), and cases interpreting the "Stopand-Frisk" law, i.e., People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 24, 252 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964),
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quasi-criminal,' 8 and civil proceedings, 19 and those areas of exclusion substantially preempted by statute (e.g., wiretapping) 2 0 demonstrate the confusion.
The anomalous role of the grand jury in criminal proceedings compounds the
entire problem.
The grand jury is firmly entrenched in Anglo-American law.2 1 Although its
role in the judicial process has been somewhat truncated, 22 it is still considered
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273
N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966), probablejurisdiction noted, 87 Sup. Ct. 1291 (1967) ; see Note, 14 Buffalo
L. Rev. 545 (1965); Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 473 (1964).
18. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (5-4 decision; majority held evidence admissible in a criminal prosecution seized during a search incident to an arrest based
on an administrative warrant); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965) (Unanimous Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to forfeiture proceedings.) ;
People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963), cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 1000 (1964), 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 232 (1964) (demonstrates problems of
using evidence seized by private store detectives in a criminal proceeding).
19. See Sacder v. Sackler, 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 16 A.D.2d
423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (2d Dep't 1962), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d
83 (1964) (Evidence of adultery procured by husband's forced entry into wife's apartment
admissible in a divorce proceeding.); Comment, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence
Illegally Obtained by PrivateParties, 72 Yale L.J. 1062 (1963).
The distinction between private and state action has been blurred by Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1953), which held that the enforcement of restrictive covenants against
Negroes by state courts constitutes state action forbidden by the fourteenth amendment. See
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 (1960).
See Comment, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 271, 275 n.26 which suggests that tort damages are
not a substitute for enforcement of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. See generally
Foote, supra note 5; Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1173 (1931).
20. Evidence obtained from wiretapping was held admissible under the fourth amendment in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (5-4 decision; Brandeis and Holmes,
Jf., dissenting). However, this was remedied by the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937),
and Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1953), have interpreted this act to apply to
federal, state and private persons in excluding wiretap evidence from federal prosecutions.
See also Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) (The act applies to both interstate
and intrastate communications.). Swartz v. Texas, 364 U.S. 199 (1952) (Wiretap evidence
is admissible in state prosecutions.), and People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689,
229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962) (Wiretap evidence is admissible where obtained pursuant to N.Y.
Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a.) have apparently been overruled by Berger v. New York, 87 Sup.
Ct. 1873 (1967), striking down N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a. Note, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 369
(1963) (other state statutes are collected here) ; see also Donnelly, Comments and Caveats
on the Wire Tapping Controversy, 63 Yale L.J. 799 (1954); Williams, The WiretappingEavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's View, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 855 '(1960).
For other types of electronic devices, compare Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 477
(1963) (6-3 majority upheld conviction based on recorded bribe), with Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (Incriminating statements gained by placing a "spike mike" in
the wall of defendant's house violated the fourth amendment.).
21. For the development of the grand jury in England and the United States, see
Edwards, The Grand Jury (1906); 1 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 320-50 (7th
ed. 1956); Jenks, A Short History of English Law (1913); Orfield, Criminal Procedure From
Arrest to Appeal (1947); Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th ed.
1956); Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law 110-50 (2d ed. 1898); Morse, A Survey
of the Grand Jury System, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 101-20 (1931) ; see also United States v. Johnson,
319 U.S. 503 (1943); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. Smyth, 104 F.
Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
22. Cook, New York Troika: Conflicting Roles of the Grand Jury, 11 Buffalo L.
Rev. 42, at 53 (1961):
[T]raditional grand jury roles have become debilitated in recent years as a result
of irreconcilable intra-role conflict and in the face of inevitable social change. Each of
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by a few writers to be a bulwark of American justice 2 3 The need for the grand
jury has long been a subject of debate: on the one hand, it is defended as one of
the few institutions in the judicial process (along with the petit jury) in which
the people participate as judges rather than as adversaries. On the other hand,
this argument for its viability is questioned-at least during the initial stages of
a criminal prosecution, it is perhaps more desirable to have objective standards
controlling than the uncontrolled inferences of the grand jurors. Those who
question the usefulness of the grand jury generally agree that it has a viable
role as an investigatory institution in examining large-scale corruption or other
such politically-tainted issues. But the converse may be true when dealing with
emotionally-tempered crimes such as murders or rapes; in such cases, objective procedures and a detached magistrate would help to insure a fair determination of probable cause for arrest and detention. The grand jury's composition,
powers and functions are generally prescribed by statute,2 4 but in addition there
have been some constitutional 25 and case law2 6 developments.
The grand jury has two basic functions: it acts both as an inquisitorial and
an accusatorial body. In its inquisitorial role27 the grand jury is convened to
the roles has had its effectiveness challenged-the role of inquisitor by modern professional police forces, the role of reporter by local representative government and
the free press, and the role of protector by informations filed by an elected prosecutor
supplemented by the right to an open preliminary hearing.
23. For arguments supporting the grand jury, see Current Notes, Dewey Speaks on the
Grand Jury, 22 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 217 (1941); Lawyer, Should the Grand Jury System
be Abolished?, 15 Yale LJ. 178 (1906); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (pts.
1-3), 10 Ore. L. Rev. 101, 217, 295 (1931); Younger, The Grand Jury Under Attack, 46 J.
Crim. L., C. & P.S. 214 (1955); Note, Should the Grand Jury System be Abolished?, 45 Ky.
L. Rev. 151 (1956). For arguments contra, see 2 Bentham, Works 171 (Bowring ed. 1843);
Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 423; Elliff,
Notes on the Abolition of Grand Juries in England, 29 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 3 (1938);
Heyting, The Abolition of Grand Juries in England, 19 A.B.A.J. 648 (1933); Kranitz, The
Grand Jury: Past-Present-NoFuture, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 318 (1959); Vukasin, Useful or
Useless-The GrandJury, 34 Calif. S.BJ. 436 (1959).
24. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6-7 deal specifically with the grand jury, the indictment and the
information. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have just recently been revised there has been no great change of substance in Rules 6-7.
See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 223-67, which deal with the grand jury and §§ 145-47,
which deal with the information. New York is currently revising the entire Code of Criminal Procedure but tentative drafts are not yet available. See 7 N.Y. Temp. Comm'n on
Constitutional Convention Rep., Individual Liberties-The Administration of Criminal Justice 115-62 (1967).
25. The Constitution provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S.
Const. amend V. Capital or infamous has been interpreted to mean punishment at hard labor
or imprisonment in a penitentiary for more than one year. United States v. Moreland, 258
U.S. 433 (1922) ; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
In addition, grand jury indictments have been held not to be required in state criminal
prosecutions. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
26. For an excellent statement of federal law on indictments and informations, see
1 Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules 331-740 (1966). For selective topics
on the development of New York law on grand juries see Van Voorhis, The History in New
York State of the Powers of Grand Juries, 26 Albany L. Rev. 1 (1962).
27. See Orfield, op. cit. supra note 21, at 75; Dession &Cohen, The InquisitorialFunctions
of Grand Juries,41 Yale L.J. 687 (1932); Scigliano, The Grand Jury, the Information, and the
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consider testimony and evidence of corruption, crime and disorder on a large
scale. Here, as suggested above, the grand jury possibly performs its most
valuable function; it is largely immune from the political pressures which confront an elected prosecutor acting alone. Generally this type of grand jury is
impanelled at the request of an important executive or legislative body. It is
arguable that even here, a specially-appointed investigator or prosecutor could
perform this function, thus dispensing with this particular need for the grand
jury.
In its accusatorial role,2 8 the grand jury focuses on a particular person or
crime, in contradistinction to the more general and wide-ranging investigation
mentioned above. The narrower inquest is the grand jury's more common role, and
the cause of much of the disenchantment with it. In this accusatorial role, the
grand jury passes on the probable guilt 29 of an individual, either by finding a "no
true bill" and releasing him30 or by handing up an indictment 3' and sending him
on to trial. If an indictment is found all the sanctions of the criminal process
ensue, viz., loss of liberty, humiliation, possible ostracism by the public and
irreparable damage to the accused's reputation-even if he should be acquitted
at the trial. These pre-conviction penalties mitigate the strength of the oftrepeated dogma that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. This
fact would seem to compel the use of precise and fair procedures to insure jus-2
tice to both parties involved-accuser and accused alike. Yet it is questionable
whether the grand jury provides the needed fairness, especially since the grand
jury is generally considered a mere rubber stamp for the prosecutor. The process
of investigation and indictment, as distinguished from a proceeding by preJudicial Inquiry, 38 Ore. L. Rev. 303 (1959); Wickersham, The Grand Jury, 38 N.Y.S.BJ.
426 (1966); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 590 (1961);
Note, 2 Drake L. Rev. 26 (1952).

28. See generally Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 403 (1931); Morse, supra note 23; Orfield, The Federal Grand
Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343 (1959).
29. Although the accused is ostensibly innocent until proven guilty, each stage in the
criminal process leading to the ultimate decision of innocence or guilt requires a different
quantum and quality of evidence and is subject to increasingly demanding procedures and
standards. At the arrest stage the requisite standard of guilt is probable cause for the arrest.
At the trial the standard required is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But the intermediate
stage can be viewed as a grey area which focuses on the probable guilt of the accused. Where
there is an information and a preliminary hearing it is theoretically simple to provide objective safeguards for both the prosecutor and the accused. But this is not true of the grand
jury, for by its very nature, it is generally considered a sounding board for the prosecutor
and is subject to few pre-trial judicial controls. Thus it is hard to judge whether the grand
jury finds an extended probable cause of guilt or the probable guilt of the accused.
30. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f).
31. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f); see generally Orfield, op. cit. supra note 21; McClintock,
Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 153 (1942).
32. See Baker & De Long, The Prosecuting Attorney: The Process of Prosecution, 26
J. Crim. L., C.& P.S. 3 (1935); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
on Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960) ; Miller, Informations or Indictments in
Felony Cases, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 379 (1924); Morse, supra note 23, at 295; Whyte, Is the
GrandJury Necessary?, 45 Va. L. Rev. 461 (1959).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
sentment 33 or by an information,8 4 is cloaked in secrecy a5 with the accused having few rights. Proceedings of the grand jury are ex parte; it has general powers
of subpoena; and rules of evidence are not applicable to its secret proceedings.
If subpoenaed to testify the accused has no right to be represented by counsel
or to confront accusing witnesses. 30 Perhaps the only beacon of light in this area
is that the prospective defendant cannot be compelled to give incriminating tes37
timony before the grand jury.
Generally an indictment valid on its face is sufficient to call for a trial on
the merits of the charge, 38 unless a timely motion to dismiss3 9 is granted. Such a
motion may be based on procedural or substantive defects in the indictment,
such as that the grand jury was improperly impanelled, 40 that there was an
33. "A presentment is an accusation originating with the grand jury, rather than with
the prosecutor, which must be drawn into a bill of indictment and resubmitted to the
jury." Cook, supra note 22, at 42 n.26; see generally Orfield, op. cit. supra note 21, at 157;
Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1103
(1955); Oliver, The Grand Jury: An Effort To Get a Dragon Out of His Cave, 1962 Wash.
U.L.Q. 166; Weinstein & Shaw, Grand Jury Reports-A Safeguard of Democracy, 1962 Wash.
U.L.Q. 191; but see United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), 51 Va. L. Rev. 333
(1965) (A grand jury may not compel a United States Attorney to sign an indictment.).
34. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a). The information is generally filed immediately after the
accused has had a hearing before a magistrate for a determination of probable guilt. The
information is considered by many writers more commensurate with the modern needs
and views of the criminal process. Not only is it more efficient and expedient than the grand
jury indictment, but it also is subject to certain procedural safeguards, viz., the hearing is
an adversary proceeding, the accused has a right to counsel and confrontation of witnesses
at the hearing, and the exclusionary rules of evidence apply. See Calkins, supra note 23;
Miller, supra note 32; Moley, The Use of the Information in Criminal Cases, 17 A.B.A.J.
292 (1931) ; Moley, The Initiation of Crimilial Prosecutions by Indictment or Information,
29 Mich. L. Rev. 403 (1931) ; Morse, supra note 23, at 217, 295. For arguments criticizing
certain aspects of the information, see Hall, Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury,
22 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 692 (1932); Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1921); Scigliano, The Grand Jury, the Information, and the Judicial Inquiry,
38 Ore. L. Rev. 303, 308-09 (1959).
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which adopted the federal rule from In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), that the sixth amendment's right of confrontation of witnesses
at a preliminary hearing applies to the states. But see Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965) (The finding of an indictment obviates
the necessity of a preliminary hearing; there is no constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing).
35. An argument supporting secrecy is that secrecy allows the accused to be protected
from public humiliation and harassment if the grand jury finds a no true bill. See Scigliano,
supra note 34, at 308-09 (1959). On the other hand, secrecy is considered an archaism
which allows too much discretion to the prosecutor acting in conjunction with the grand
jury. See Calkins, supra note 23, at 432-35 (1966) ; Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 Mich. L
Rev. 455 (1965); Heyting, supra note 23. But see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) (disclosure of
proceedings "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment") ; Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) (disclosure of grand jury minutes
where testimony at trial is uncorroborated and essential to proving the charge).
36. See supra note 34.
37. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (federal grand juries) ; Taylor v.
Forbes, 143 N.Y. 219, 38 N.E. 303 (1894) (New York grand juries); Birzon & Gerard, The
Prospective Defendant Rule and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in New York, 15
Buffalo L. Rev. 595 (1966).
38. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, rehearing denied, 351 U.S. 904 (1956);
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, rehearingdenied, 355 U.S. 967 (1958), 4 How. L.J. 267
(1958).
39. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b).
40. Romney v. United States, 167 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 847
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amendment or substantive change in the indictment, 41 that the charge of a crime
was too general to allow the accused to prepare a defense 42 or that the indictment
was based on insufficient or illegal evidence. This last ground for dismissal is the
least clear. An indictment not supported by any evidence will fall, 43 but if based
on insufficient evidence it will probably stand. Insufficient evidence refers to the
grey area where probable cause of guilt may or may not exist because the quantum or quality of evidence is not sufficiently probative to link the accused with
the charged offense. Because grand jury proceedings are ex parte, secret and not
subject to rules of evidence, courts will generally not dismiss the indictment on
this ground. An indictment will not be dismissed if based on incompetent
evidence, i.e., evidence having auxiliary probative value, such as hearsay.45
An indictment will not be dismissed if based either entirely or in part on evidence
which is illegal because it is the fruit of some act forbidden by a statute or the
Constitution.4" Although some state statutes provide that a grand jury shall
(1948); but see United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944) (There is no challenge for
cause other than legal qualifications.).
41. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(e); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960); Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887); United States v. Harmon, 34 Fed. 872 (8th Cir. 1888).
42. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c); United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962) (A motion
to dismiss an indictment is tested by its sufficiency to charge an offense.); United States
v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953); United States v. Kelley, 254 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
However, this defect can perhaps be remedied by a bill of particulars under Fed. R. Crim.

P. 7(f).

43. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928) (holding); Shushan v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574, rehearingdenied, 314 U.S. 706
(1942) (dictum); United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1881) (dictum); People
v. Ristenblatt, 1 Abb. Pr. 268 (Ct. Gen. Sess. N.Y. 1855) (holding).
44. See United States v. Grosso, 358 ,F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966) (An indictment is not
open to challenge on the ground that evidence presented to the grand jury was either incompetent or inadequate.); United States ex rel. Combs v. Denno, 231 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.
N.Y. 1964); see also Grace v. United States, 4 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S.
702 (1925) (A motion to quash is addressed to the discretion of the court.) ; United States
v. Beadon, 49 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 625 (1931).
45. Incompetent evidence includes evidence excludable under the best evidence, character, hearsay and opinion rules of evidence. See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2175 passin
(3d ed. 1940).
However, incompetent evidence is used to establish probable cause for the arrest, for
the issuance of a search warrant and for the indictment. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959) (Hearsay of informant and the personal observations of an officer established
probable cause for the arrest.); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (hearsay as
basis for a search warrant); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (The Court, per
Holmes, J., held that incompetent evidence, so long as it provided a "substantial basis,"
could establish probable cause for an indictment.); accord, Costello v. United States, 350
U.S. 359 (1956) ; United States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1966) ; in re Fried, 68 F.
Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1946), writ dismissed, 332 U.S. 807
(1947), 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1947); see Comment, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 102, 104 n.8 for
federal cases following Holt. For cases contra, see Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376
(8th Cir. 1930); United States v. Bolles, 209 Fed. 682 (7th Cir. 1913); United States v.
Rubin, 218 Fed. 245 (D. Conn. 1914).
For an excellent perspective of this area of the law see Comment, The Ries of Evidence as a Factorin ProbableCause in Grand Jury Proceedingsand PreliminaryExaminations,
1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 102; Comment, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand
Jury Proceedings, 72 Yale L.J. 590 (1963); Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 111 (1948); Annot., 100
L. Ed. 397 (1957).
46. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Anderson v. United States,
273 Fed. 20 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 647 (1921); Hilman v. United States, 192
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consider only legal evidence 4 7 the state courts have interpreted these statutes as
dnly directory48 since grand jury proceedings are ex parte and there is no presiding judge to pass on the legality of the evidence. There is no such comparable
rule of evidence in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as in these state
statutes. Nor have the Supreme Court and the circuit courts recognized such a

rule under the McNabb-Mallory40 doctrine of judicial supervision over the lower
federal courts. 0
In the instant case the court maintained that since "an indictment is only
a formal charge ...

to bring an accused into court to answer the charge made

. . . all evidence necessary to substantiate that charge beyond a reasonable
doubt ... at trial-incompetent or inadmissible evidence.., is not admitted and
of course could not affect the trial proceedings." 5' 1 Thus there is no reason to
Fed. 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 225 U.S. 699 (1911) ; United States v. Block, 202 F. Supp.
705-(S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y.
1943); United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Rex v. Dodd, 1 Leach
CL.. 155, 108 Eng. Rep. 180 (1777); contra, United States v. Smith, 23 F. Supp. 528 (E.D.
Mo. 1938); United States v. Yuck Kee, 281 Fed. 228 (D.C. Minn. 1922); United States
v. Bush, 269 Fed. 455 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
Also see Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) which held that the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 made wiretapping evidence illegal and hence inadmissible in
federal grand jury proceedings.
47. See Ala. Code tit. 30, § 86 (1958); Ariz. R. Crim. P. § 103 (1956); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 43-918 (1947); Cal. Pen. Code § 939.6 (1960); Idaho Code Ann. § 19-1105 (1948);
Iowa Code Ann. § 771.17 (1950); Ky. Crim. Code Prac. § 107 (1960); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 15.213 (1951); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 628.59 (1963); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94.6318
(1947); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 172.260 (1950); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-22 (1953); N.D. Cent.
Code § 29-10-24 (1960) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 333-34 (1937) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 132.320
(1959); Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-3 (1953). New York had such a statute in N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 256, but this section was repealed by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 551.
48. See, e.g., Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 481 (1875); Pfeiffer v. State, 35 Ariz.
321, 278 Pac. 63 (1929); McDonald v. State, 155 Ark. 142, 244 S.W. 20 (1922); People
v. Hatch, 13 Cal. App. 521, 109 Pac. 1097 (1910) ; State v. Hiatt, 231 Iowa 643, 1 N.W.2d
736 (1942); Birchan v. Commonwealth, 238 S.W.2d 1008 (Ky. 1951); State v. Simpson, 216
La. 212, 43 So. 2d 585 (1949); State v. Ernster, 147 Minn. 811, 179 N.W. 640 (1920);
Nevada v. Logan, 1 Nev. 509 (1865); State v. Chance, 29 N.M. 34, 221 Pac. 183 (1923);
Robinson v. Territory, 16 Okla. 241, 85 Pac. 451 (1905), rev'd on other grounds, 148 Fed.
830 (8th Cir. 1906) ; State v. McDonald, 231 Ore. 24, 361 P.2d 1001 (1961).
Most states will not quash an indictment because the grand jury considered some incompetent evidence. See Comment, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in Probable Cause
in Grand Jury Proceedings and Preliminary Examinations, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 102, 112 n.47.
But see People v. Rodriguez, 28 Misc. 2d 310, 215 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1961), holding
that even if there is sufficient competent evidence, the indictment will be dismissed if the
incompetent evidence unduly influenced the finding of the indictment.
49. The Supreme Court closely supervises federal criminal procedure with resulting
rules that are not expressly compelled by the Constitution or a statute. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), reaffirmed in, Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
50. But compare justice Field's Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 993 (No.
18225) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) ("[You will receive only legal evidence, to the exclusion of
mere reports, suspicions and hearsay evidence. . . ."); and Charge to Grand Jury, 30
Fed. Cas. 1036 (No. 18272) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1861); and Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed.
Cas. 998 (C.C.D. Md. 1836) (per Chief Justice Taney); and Charge to Grand Jury, 16 F.R.D.
93, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ("There must be some competent testimony before you, otherwise
there is no probable cause .... "); with Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (Incompetent evidence can be used to establish probable cause so long as it provides a "substantial
basis" for the indictment.).
51. West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50, 56 (8th Cir.), cert. denied inem., 87 Sup.
Ct. 131 (1966).
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extend the exclusionary rule of Elkins v. United States52 to grand jury proceedings.5 3 Citing Costello v. United States54 as holding that "grand jury consideration
of inadmissible evidence does not render the indictment defective," 55 the court
reasoned that the policy behind the exclusionary rule, the need "to curb illegal
police practices," 50 would not be furthered, that an undue burden would be placed
upon the government to make an "ex parte determination of the legality of the
offered evidence" 57 and that since there is no presiding judge it would be impossible to have "at this point in the litigation a final and binding determination of
the legality of the offered evidence." 58 Finally the court said the mere fact that
"there was illegally seized evidence before the grand jury" 59 does not compel the
conclusion that this evidence "adversely influenced the entire balance of the
indictment, including the entirely independent count [sale 60of marijuana] unrelated to the charge for which the evidence was presented.1
As previously stated, 61 there is some question as to what the grand jury
finds: probable guilt or a form of probable cause for believing the accused guilty.
If the grand jury does pass on the probable guilt of an accused, which may be the
case,6 2 it has been suggested that a better approach to the indictment process
would be to change the standard to one of probability of conviction. 3 This would
provide a proper balance between the need for protection of the innocent from
the stringent penalties of the criminal process and the need for insuring
the prosecution proper and effective machinery to bring criminals to justice.
However, the grand jury proceeding, unlike the information and preliminary
examination, is not subject to procedural safeguards. 64 This creates an anomalous
situation in light of Mapp v. Ohio,65 the prospective defendant rule6 6 and other
52. 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (Evidence illegally obtained by state officers is inadmissible in
a federal criminal trial.).
53. West v. United States, 359 F.2d at 55-56 (1966).
54. 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (In this pre-Mapp case, the Court was considering an indictment based on hearsay and not an indictment based on illegal evidence although there is
sweeping dicta to the contrary.).
55. West v. United States, 359 F.2d at 56 (1966).
56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.

60. Id. at 57.
61. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.

62. See Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 111 n.5 (1948).
63. Comment, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence

from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72 Yale L.J. 590, 592 (1963):
While the presumption of innocence prohibits the ascription of "guilt" except upon

conviction, its broadening of "innocence" to include all states of nonconviction suggests the need for a prospective view of a subject's innocence-prognostic innocence. A man is prognostically innocent when the body of evidence relating to him
cannot lead to a conviction at trial. In screening out unfounded accusations, the
grand jury should not indict any one prognostically innocent in relation to the evidence it has heard; the foundation for the accusation of such a person cannot lead
to a destruction of his state of innocence, and cannot be justified as part of a
process leading to conviction.
64. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
65. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; see supra note 5.
66. See supra note 36.
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recent developments 07 in criminal procedure. Mapp seemed to indicate that
08
illegally seized evidence is not to be used at all to convict an accused. Arguably,
the returning of an indictment is a form of conviction, because it sets in motion
several pre-conviction penalties. Both the grand jury and the preliminary hearing perform the same function, viz., finding some form of probable cause of guilt
of an accused, yet only the preliminary hearing is subject to mandate of Mapp
that judicial proceedings are not to consider illegally-seized evidence. Also, it
is questionable whether it is constitutionally consistent to allow the prospective
defendant invoke the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination if
subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, and then be subsequently indicted
on the basis of illegal evidence. Finally, recent developments in the area of
coerced confessions and the right to counsel immediately after arrest seem to
compel a reconsideration of the issue of the grand jury's using illegally-seized
evidence to indict an accused: on one hand the accused has certain inviolate
rights from the moment of arrest, but after arrest his rights may be violated
when he is indicted on the basis of illegal evidence.
Once it is recognized that the grand jury does pass on probability of conviction, and should not be allowed to consider illegal evidence, the question then
becomes one of proper enforcement. Various methods are available, e.g., abolish
the grand jury; 69 allow a more liberal use of the motion to suppress the illegal
evidence; 70 or formulate a rule which would compel the prosecution to inform
the grand jury of the nature of the evidence it is considering. 71 The problem
here is again one of enforcement of the judicial rule. Possible methods of enforcement are the use of injunctive relief, 72 a motion to suppress the evidence before
the indictment is returned, a motion to quash the indictment, and the threat of
reversal if any possible prejudice could have resulted to the accused from the use
of the illegal evidence before the grand jury.73 A liberal granting of motions
67. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 439 (1967) (both decisions holding that the sixth amendment
compels the police to take positive steps in ensuring all statements obtained from the accused be voluntary, e.g., the accused has an immediate right to counsel after arrest, he has
an inviolate right to remain silent, etc.) ; see Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old Voluntariness Test, 65
Mich. L. Rev. 59 (1966).
68. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 648 (1961) ; see infra note 73.
69. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. However, this would raise constitutional
problems if advocated on the federal level.
70. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e); see Comment, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from
FederalGrandJury Proceedings,72 Yale L.J. 590, 594-95 (1963).
71. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Also see United States v. Costello, 353
U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (Burton, J., concurring on the ground that there should be no indictment unless based on sufficient and rationally persuasive evidence); accord, United
States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, 3., dissenting on the
ground that if the indictment is to be based on hearsay the prosecutor should inform the
grand jury of "the shoddy merchandise they are getting so they can seek something better
if they wish.") ; Costello v. United States, 221 F.2d 668, 679 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., concurring) ; In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1947).
72. But see Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963) (Federal injunction against a state
official's testifying in state criminal proceedings denied.).
73. See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) ("The question is whether there is a
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to inspect the grand jury's minutes would facilitate the enactment of any or all
of these methods of enforcement of the judicial rule.7 4 However, even more
difficult problems arise, as in the instant case,75 where the causal relation between the illegally-obtained evidence and the entire indictment is hard to gauge.76
It is harder yet to see the relation between the two separate offenses charged in
the indictment. 77 Although the instant case was probably correctly decided, it
was unnecessary to base the holding on the broad ground that the fourth amendment mandate against using illegal evidence in judicial proceedings has no application to grand jury proceedings. On the contrary, both recent developments
in criminal procedure and basic concepts of fairness" seem to compel a different
conclusion, especially in light of the fact that the grand jury's role in the judicial process has changed.79 Although its substantive role has changed, its archaic
procedures have not undergone the same process of modernization. If such a
rule of evidence is applied to the indictment process, it would move the grand
jury's procedures closer to those embodied in the preliminary hearing, which
are presently considered more inherently just to both the accused and the state.80
MICHAEL NELsoN

reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. at 86-87); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)
("The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be
used at all."); but see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (Automatic reversal if
coerced confession is used at trial; quantum of other evidence is irrelevant.).
74. See supra note 35.
75. West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.), cert. denied Viem., 87 Sup. Ct. 131
(1966).
76. See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966) (Potential use of illegally obtained
evidence is not cause for dismissal of an indictment.); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338 (1939) (The accused must establish a causal connection between the illegal governmental
activity and the evidence on which the indictment is based.).
77. See Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262 (1898) (Distinct offenses, although
charged in one indictment, retain their separate character so that error to one has no basic
influence on the other.).
78. For the premises on which strict and liberal views of criminal justice are based
compare the warning of Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) that, "The criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered," with Justice Brandeis' warning in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) that:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit
a crime in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution.
See generally Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 719 (1966).
79. See supranote 22 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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